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TAX-FREE CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS-THE LAW 
AND THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS* 
Robert L. Merrittt 
The king cried aI.oud. to bring in the astrologers, the Chaldeans, 
and the soothsayers. And the king spake, and said to the wise men 
of Babylon, Whosoever shall read this writing, and show me the inter-
pretation thereof, shall be clothed. with scarlet, and have a chain of 
gold about his neck, and shall be the third ruler in the kingdom. 
DANIEL 5:7 
THE quest for interpretation is indeed an ancient one. path is pervaded by a search for meanings. Our life 
It has been said of the law that it is sometimes better to have a 
bad rule than to have no rule. I suppose the rationale is that unsatis-
factory certainties at least permit action, and are susceptible to a change 
for the better, the very badness of the rule serving to accelerate the 
equitable resolution. Being neither philosopher nor historian, I do 
not know whether that patience which awaits ultimate improvement 
is always a virtue.1 
Two tools of the practicing lawyer in dealing with the affairs of 
his clients are the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regula-
tions which, to paraphrase the learned judge, are the administrative 
moons reflecting the light of the statute. In a measure, the writer 
and enforcer of the Regulations is the "third ruler in the kingdom." 
The Congress enacts the law, and the courts are the last resort:2 of 
interpretation and application. In between lies great responsibility.3 
* This article is based in part on a paper, "Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Busi-
ness" which was delivered by the author on November 9, 1954 at the New York Univer-
sity 13th Annual Institute on Federal Taxation. The proceedings of that Institute are 
published by Matthew Bender & Company, Albany, New York. 
t Member, New York and Ohio Bars.-Ed. 
1 Cf. Justice Reed's dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 
U.S. 187 at 200-201, 75 S.Ct. 229 (1955): ''There is a certain hesitation in dissenting 
from an interpretation of a tax statute re~ediable by Congress, but as the Court's decision 
springs, we think, from an overemphasis on regulations, a protest may have usefulness as 
a counterweight against future extensions of such treatment to statutory language." 
2 Pending, of course, a further round when the Congress enacts additional or remedial 
legislation. 
3 The Internal Revenue Service should be ever mindful that "unless the tax asserted 
by the Commissioner has been authorized by Congress, it fails of validity •••• " Helvering 
v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 at 394, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943). 
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The Bar is particularly concerned at this time that this responsibility be 
conscientiously fullilled. Forthrightness in interpretation should 
cause no one to fear the lion's den. 
This article will illustrate, by reference to some aspects of the new 
"B" (corporate acquisition of stock) and "C" (corporate acquisition of 
property) reorganization definitions, instances in which the impatient 
practitioner would replace proposed certainties ( or neglected or in-
advertent uncertainties) with more seemly interpretations. 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are part of the dynamics of 
the business world. The financial pages report the increasing rate at 
which mergers and other corporate acquisitions are being effected. 
The strengthening of the economy through these means, subject to 
the restraints and philosophy of the antitrust laws, is generally to be 
encouraged.4 Since 1918 the tax law has contained rules causing the 
nonrecognition of gain or loss realized as a result of such corporate 
transactions.5 The particular rules governing nonrecognition have 
been changed over the years, 6 and periodically a reexamination has 
been made of the directions chosen and the effectiveness of the statutory 
solutions. 
The preparation of H.R. 83007 offered a splendid opportunity to 
the Congress and the Treasury to reexamine the reorganization pro-
visions of the 1939 code with a view toward clarifying uncertainties in 
meaning, writing into the statute some of the products of judicial 
decision and remedying by clear language the occasional harsh imprints 
on the body of law which have resulted therefrom. Unfortunately, the 
4 BtlTTERS, l..rnnmR AND CAllY, EFFECTS OF T AXATION-CoRPORATll MERGERS, 
c. 1 (1951), discuss opposing viewpoints as to whether recent merger activity is signifi-
cantly promoting industrial concentration and monopoly. The book analyzes the effect of 
raxes on the sale of profitable closely held companies. See also REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY 
GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMMI'lTllll To STUDY THE ANrrrnusT LAws (March 31, 1955); 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMisSION ON CoRPORATll MERGERS AND ACQmSI• 
TIONS (May 1955). 
5 The Revenue Act of 1918, §202(b) provided certain nomecognition rules in the 
case of a "reorganization, merger or consolidation." No definition of these terms appeared 
in the statute until §202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921 was enacted. 
6 See 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, c. 20 (1942 and 1954 Supp.); 
PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, Third Series, 1-165 (1940). See also H. Rep. 
1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 34 (1954). 
7 H.R. 8300, as passed by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1954, will be 
referred to as the "House Bill," and as passed by the Senate on July 2, 1954 will be 
referred to as the "Senate Bill." H.R. 8300, as passed by Congress on July 29, 1954 and 
enacted into law on August 16, 1954 as P.L. 591, 83d Cong., 2d sess., will be referred 
to as the "Internal Revenue Code of 1954," "1954 code'' or "I.R.C. (1954)." The prior 
law will be referred to with 1939 designations. See I.R.C. (1954), §770l(a)(29). H no 
code designation is indicated, the 1954 code is meant. 
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reach exceeded the grasp; the result of the legislative effort has been 
to multiply the uncertainties. The fault is not all in the statute; the 
interpretation thereof is wanting. The Proposed Regulations under 
section 368 (the "reorganization" definitions section) deal with the 
new areas of doubt by either ignoring their existence or resolving them 
in favor of recognition of gain or loss. The first course, while dis-
appointing, is not affirmatively harmful. The solutions obtained 
through the second course warrant reconsideration by the Treasury. 
I. "NET EFFECT" AND "STEP TRANSACTION" PROBLEMS 
The House Bill and the accompanying Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report are keys to the proper interpretation of section 368.8 
This is so even though the House Bill abandoned the familiar re-
organization terminology and introduced entirely new concepts. Much 
of the substance of the House Bill with respect to corporate acquisitions 
of stock9 or property1° was continued in modified form in the Senate 
Bill, and was enacted as the "B"11 and "C"12 reorganization definitions. 
The Ways and Means Committee had admirable objectives, one 
of which was to make the law sufficiently definite to permit taxpayers 
to ascertain in advance the tax consequences of their actions when 
effecting corporate distributions and adjustments. The House Bill 
was designed to promote clarity and certainty and "to insure that the 
same tax consequences result from the different types of transactions 
which are available to accomplish substantially the same result."13 
Taxpayers were to be prevented from in effect choosing the type of 
tax for which they would be liable through a choice of one road rather 
than another to the same destination. 
The Senate Finance Committee agreed with the above objectives, 
but balked at the House Bill solutions. It felt that the House Bill 
achieved certainty at the sacrifice of the legislative flexibility needed to 
8 The history of how the House Bill came into being and the extent of the influence 
of the Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute on that bill is discussed in 
Darrell, "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 1955 SounmRN CALIFORNIA TAX INsn-
TU'I'B 1 (1955). See American Law Institute, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax 
Project, CoMPAIUSON OF THE .AMERICAN LAw INsTITaTB FEBRUARY, 1954 INco:r.m TAX 
DRAFT AND 1954 !NrnRNAL REvBNcm ConB, p. 20 (February 1, 1955). 
o House Bill, §359(b). 
10 House Bill, §359(c). 
11 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(B). 
121.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(C). 
13 H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 39 (1954). See also p. 34. H. Rep. 1337 is 
hereinafter referred to as "House Report." 
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provide an equitable statutory pattern for taxing the numerous varieties 
of corporate reorganizations.14 
It is surprising, in view of these expressions of intent, to find that 
the Proposed Regulations under section 368 fail to mention the possible 
application of a "net effect" test or the "step transaction" rule either 
generally, or in connection with specific situations, such as those dis· 
cussed below. Continuing in substance the language of the Regula· 
tions15 which interpret the 1939 code, the Proposed Regulations16 
provide, "Section 368(a)(l) limits the definition of the term 'r~ 
organization' to six kinds of transactions and excludes all others. From 
its context, the term 'a party to a reorganization' can only mean a party 
to a transaction specifically defined as a reorganization by section 
368(a) .... A plan of reorganization must contemplate the bona 
fide execution of one of the transactions specifically described as a 
reorganization in section 368(a) and for [sic] the bona fide consumma• 
tion of each of the requisite acts under which nonrecognition of gain 
is claimed .... "17 This is a strong brew of "specificallys," made even 
stronger by the further statement in the Proposed Regulations18 that 
"The application of the term 'reorganization' is to be strictly limited 
to the specific transactions set forth in section 368(a) .... " 
If there were not a history of the courts applying a "net effect"19 
test, and of. the Internal Revenue Service itself urging such a test in 
particular cases, this would be troublesome language indeed. But 
even so, the problem is not a simple one and requires some attention. 
Primarily, if there is to be a net effect test contended for by the Service 
and applied by the courts, the Regulations should leave some leeway 
for the application of such a test. The Regulations should not be 
written so as to be disregarded on suitable occasions. In addition, 
where does the taxpayer stand where the convenient and direct path 
is not "specifically" spelled out in the statute or the Regul~tions, but 
14S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 41-42 (1954). S. Rep. 1622 is hereinafter 
referred to as "Senate Report." 
15 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-1. 
16Proposed Regulations §1.368-l(c). The Proposed Regulations were published in 
the Federal Register on December 11, 1954. 
17 Italics supplied. This provision may have originally been based on the statutory 
statement that "the term 'reorganization' means" etc. See Hendricks, "Federal Income Tax: 
Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 45 H.Allv. L. REv. 648 at 650 (1932), which observes 
that "The use of this word probably indicates that the definition shall not be susceptible 
of expansion or addition .••• " 
18.Proposed Regulations, §l.368-2(a). See also Proposed Regulations, §l.368-2(g). 
·, 19 See Mintz and Plumb, "Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U. 
12-ra AmmAL INSTITUTE oN FEDERAL TAXATION 247 at 250 (1954), which refers to this 
as an "end result" test, under which a given intended J:esult will have the same tax effect 
1955] T AX-FREB CoRPORATB AcQuismoNs 915 
the inconvenient and roundabout route clearly meets one of the re-
organization definitions? Does getting to Scotland ·on the low road 
require the giving up of (nonrecognition) rights which accompany 
the taking of the high road? 
A. The Groman and Bashford Rules 
The "net effect" problems created by the 1954 code, which the 
Proposed Regulations leave unresolved in some instances and which 
they unsatisfactorily resolve in others, can be illustrated by examples of 
the operation of the revised Groman20 and Bashford21 rules.22 
In the Groman case Glidden Company formed an Ohio corpora-
tion and became the owner for a cash consideration of all of its com-
mon stock. Pursuant to an agreement contemplating such action, 
to which agreement Glidden was a party, the shareholders of an 
Indiana corporation transferred all their shares of stock in that corpo-
ration to Ohio in exchange23 for the latter's nonvoting 6 percent cumu-
lative preferred stock, 7 percent prior preferred stock of Glidden, and 
cash. After Ohio acquired all of Indiana's outstanding stock, the latter 
was dissolved. Ohio thus coming into possession of all of Indiana's 
assets.24 The issue in the case was whether the receipt of the Glidden 
7 percent prior preferred stock by Indiana's shareholders constituted 
taxable income to them, it being conceded that the receipt of Ohio's 
preferred stock did not and that the receipt of the cash did. 
whether achieved directly or by circuitous steps. The authors consider this to be a refine-
ment of the "step transaction" doctrine that a single transaction cannot be broken up into 
its component steps. 
20 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937), opinion amended 
and rehearing den. 302 U.S. 654, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). 
21 Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 58 S.Ct. 307 (1937). 
22 See also Merritt, "Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Business," N.Y.U. 13th 
AmroAL !NsnTOT.B ON F:EI>ERAL TAXATION 693 (1955); Lurie, "Namorg-Or Groman 
Reversed," 10 TAX L. REv. 119 (1954). 
23 The Supreme Court, in the Groman case, originally stated that the shareholders of 
Indiana received nothing from Glidden. The record was not clear as to whether Indiana's 
shareholders received the Glidden stock from Glidden or from Ohio. The taxpayer peti-
tioned for a rehearing on the ground, unsupported by the record, that the stock was received 
from Glidden. Apparently to eliminate any implication that this factor was important to 
its decision, the Supreme Court corrected its opinion by deleting the statement. Groman 
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 654, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). See Lawrence v. Commissioner, 
(7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 555 at 558; Michigan Steel Corp. of New Jersey, 38 B.T.A. 
435 at 451 (1938), appeal dismissed (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 280; PAuL, STUDIES IN 
F:EI>ERAL TAXATION, Third Series, 107 (1940). · 
24 Under the Revenue Act of 1928, §112(i)(l)(A), these transactions qualified as a 
"reorganization" because there was "an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority 
of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes 
of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation .••• " 
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It was unanimously held that Glidden, although it contracted for 
the exchange and made it possible by subscribing and paying for Ohio's 
common stock in cash so that Ohio could consummate the exchange, 
was not a party to the reorganization, for it received nothing from the 
shareholders of Indiana, the exchange being between Indiana's share-
holders and Ohio. The Supreme Court characterized Glidden as 
merely "the efficient agent in bringing about a reorganization. It was 
not, in the natural meaning of the term, a party to the reorganization."25 
Moreover, the shareholders of Indiana, through ownership of Glidden 
preferred stock, did not retain a "continued substantial interest" in the 
assets conveyed to Ohio. Further, said the Supreme Court, Glidden's 
preferred stock was· "other property" "in the sense that its ownership 
represented a participation in assets in which Ohio, and its shareholders 
through it, has no proprietorship." Accordingly, the receipt by 
Indiana's shareholders of Glidden' s preferred stock was treated as the 
receipt of boot. 
The failure of the Supreme Court to find the requisite continuity 
of interest of Indiana's shareholders in the assets transferred to Ohio, 
through their ownership of Glidden prior preferred stock, was indeed 
unfortunate.26 The Groman decision and its progeny, with their un-
duly narrow application of the "continuity of interest" doctrine, stymied 
many a desired reorganization. It was generally recognized that a 
legislative reversal was necessary.27 The 1954 code has offered some 
relief, but either due to a faulty analysis of the problem or to the haste 
in which the Senate Bill was written, some further legislative relief is 
still required. Moreover, since the Proposed Regulations ignore the 
"net effect" test, even areas in which Congress has acted will require 
judicial or statutory clarification unless the final Regulations adopt a 
more reasonable approach. 
To facilitate an analysis of the 1954 code provisions, and the 
Proposed Regulations thereunder, I will first outline some of the 
factual patterns in which the Groman and Bashford and related cases 
arose. (It should be borne in mind in considering the examples that 
the facts have been considerably simplified, and that some of the cases 
arose under statutes which treated the actual transactions involved as 
"reorganizations," although under present definitions they would not 
so qualify.) 
25 302 U.S. 82 at 89, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). 
26 For criticisms of the Groman decision, see Lurie, "Namorg-Or Groman Reversed," 
IO TAX L. RBv. 119 at 123-124 (1954); MAcILL, TAXABLE lNcoMB, rev. ed., 160 (1945); 
PAUL, STUDIES IN F.EDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 119-121 (1940). 
27 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 121 (1940). 
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Example 1: Corporation P wishes to acquire all the assets of 
Corporation W. Corporation P forms a new subsidiary, Corpo-
ration A, to which the shareholders of Corporation W transfer 
all their stock in exchange for voting stock of Corporation P. 
Corporation W is then dissolved. 28 
(a) The Corporation W shareholders receive the Corpo-
ration P stock from Corporation A. 
(b) The Corporation W shareholders receive the Corpora-
tion P stock from Corporation P.29 
Example 2: The same facts as in Example l(b), except that 
Corporation P receives the Corporation W stock and then as part 
of the plan of reorganization, or within the contemplation thereof, 
transfers it to Corporation A, so that Corporation P has momen-
tary possession of Corporation A's stock.30 
Example 3: Corporation W transfers all its assets to Corpora-
tion A in exchange for voting stock of the latter's parent, Corpora-
tion P. Corporation W distributes the Corporation P stock to i~ 
shareholders and dissolves. 31 
(a) Corporation W (or its shareholders) receives the Corpo-
ration P stock from Corporation A. 
(b) Corporation W (or its shareholders) receives the Corpo-
ration P stock from Corporation P. 
Example 4: The same facts as in Example 3 (b), except that 
Corporation P receives the Corporation W assets and then as a 
part of the plans of reorganization, or within the contemplation 
thereof, transfers them to Corporation A, so that Corporation P 
has momentary possession of Corporation W's assets.82 
28 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937). Cf. Lawrence v. 
Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 555. 
29 See note 23 supra. 
30 This is essentially the difference in facts between the Bashford and Groman cases. 
Cf. Gertrude B. Chase, 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941) (reviewed) non-acq. 1941-1 Cum. Bul. 13; 
1942-1 Cum. Bul. 20, affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 740; Commissioner 
v. Kahn, (6th Cir. 1942) 133 F. (2d) 199. In both of these cases Corporation P temporarily 
put Corporation Ws stock in the possession of Corporation A; Corporation P was held to be a 
party to the reorganization. 
31 Hedden v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 311, cert. den. 308 U.S. 
575, 60 S.Ct. 117 (1939), rehearing den. 308 U.S. 636, 60 S.Ct. 172 (1939); Davis v. 
United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, cert. den. 308 U.S. 574, 60 S.Ct. 90 
(1939); Neicllich v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1019, cert. den. 308 
U.S. 599, 60 S.Ct. 130 (1939); Michigan Steel Corp., 38 B.T.A. 435 (1938), appeal 
dismissed (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 280; Park & Tilford, 43 B.T.A. 348, 374, 375 
(1941) (reviewed); Richard K. Mellon, 12 T.C. 90 (1949), affd. on another issue (3d 
Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 157. 
32 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, (8th Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 662, cert. den. 
312 U.S. 699, 61 S.Ct. 739 (1941). 
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Example .5: Corporation W transfers all its assets for 80 percent 
of the common stock of Corporatio:n A, only common being issued 
and outstanding. Corporation W, as part of the plan of reorgani-
zation, or within the contemplation thereof, then transfers the 
stock of Corporation A thus received by it, for voting stock of 
Corporation P, which thereupon becomes the parent of Corpora-
tion A. Corporation W distributes the Corporation P .stock to its 
shareholders and dissolves.33 
Example 6: The same facts as in Examples 2 or 4, except that 
the second transfer is not part of the plan of reorganization or 
a contemplated variant thereof, but is an independent transaction 
and not an essential (or indeed any) part of the plan.34 
The above examples are simplified for the purposes of this dis-
cussion by having Corporation W or its shareholders receive only 
voting stock of Corporation P, and no other stock or cash or other 
property. Under section 354(a) and its predecessors311 no gain or loss 
is recognized ( with certain limitations not pertinent at the moment) 
"if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in 
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock 
or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to 
the reorganization." In each of the above examples, other than example 
6, Corporation P was held not to be a party to a reorganization, and the 
receipt of its stock was treated as the receipt of ''boot." 
B. The Revised Groman and Bashford Rules 
It is not clear exactly how far the Congress intended to go with 
respect to offering legislative relief. The Ways and Means Committee 
Report states, ''Your committee eliminates the technical requirements 
of existing law that the corporation cannot acquire assets in a merger 
in exchange for the stock of its parent[,] thus overruling Groman . . . 
33 Whitney Corp. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 438; United Light 
& Power Co. v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 866, cert. den. 308 U.S. 574, 
60 S.Ct. 90 (1939); Commissioner v. First Nat. Bank of Altoona, (3d Cir. 1939) 104 F. 
(2d) 865; American Light & Traction Co., 42 B.T.A. 1121 (1940) (non-acq.), affd. on 
other grounds (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 365. But d. Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner, 
(3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 733. 
34 Robert Campbell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950) (acq.). See Mintz and Plumb, "Step 
Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U. 12TH ANNuAL INSTITUTE oN FEDEllAL 
TAXAnoN 247, 252 (1954). 
35 I.R.C. (1939), and the Revenue Acts of 1938, 1936, 1934, 1928, §ll2(b)(3). 
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and . . . Bashford. . . ."36 Referring to another aspect of the problem, 
the Report states that under the House Bill "a corporation may acquire 
assets for immediate transfer to a controlled subsidiary, or may arrange 
for the transfer of the assets directly from the transferor corporation to 
such subsidiary, thus changing present law under . . . Groman . . . 
and . . . Bashford. . . ."37 The Senate Committee Report adds 
nothing signi6.cant to this language,38 except that it refers to the new 
rule which deals with the 6.rst aspect of the problem as modifying39 
rather than overruling Groman and Bashford. 
The ultimate test, of course, is what the statute provides. The 
"C" reorganization de6.nition has been modi6.ed by adding thereto 
the parenthetical expression in section 368(a)(l)(C), which would 
permit the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all of the 
properties of another corporation, "in exchange solely for all or a part 
of its voting stock ( or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting 
stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation) 
.... " In addition, section 368(a)(2)(C) speci6.cally provides that 
a transaction otherwise qualifying as an "A" or a "C" reorganization 
is not disquali6.ed as such ''by reason of the fact that part or all of the 
assets which were acquired in the transaction are transferred to a 
corporation controlled by the corporation acquiring such assets." 
In addition to the modi6.cation of the "C" reorganization de6.nition 
in the manner indicated above, the "party to a reorganization" de6.ni-
tion has been expanded to include Corporation P where Corporation 
A acquires substantially all of the properties of Corporation W in 
exchange for a part or all of the voting stock of Corporation P, the 
86 House Report, p. 40. Emphasis added. The SUMMARY OF H.R. 8300, nm PRo-
POSBD INrERNAL REvmrnE CoDE OF 1954 AS PASSED BY nm HousE OF RBPIU!SENTAnv.8S, 
which was prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Finance by the technical staff 
of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, makes the remarkable statement that 
the House Bill "eliminates a formality of existing law." See Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Finance, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 2d sess., part I, p. 34 (April 7 and 
8, 1954). Perhaps here is the key to why the statute leaves so many loose ends-its 
drafters may not have had time to study fully the problem and its ramifications. See text 
to note 109 infra, indicating a situation where the Groman decision may be far from 
"overruled." 
s1 Page Al34. Emphasis added. 
SSThe Senate Bill, §368(a)(2)(C), however, did extend the House Bill rules "to 
include a case where the parent corporation receives the assets in a statutory merger or 
consolidation and immediately transfers part or all of the assets to a subsidiary." Senate 
Report, p. 52. 
39 Id. at 273. See also SuMMARY oF THB NEw PROVISIONS OF nm lNTERNAL Rllv:E-
mm ConE oF 1954 (H.R. 8300) AS AcRBBD To BY nm CoNFERBEs (Punuc I.Aw 591, 
83d CoNc.), prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 
p. 44 (1955). 
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latter being in "control"40 of Corporation A. While not spelled out in 
the statute it would appear that the stock of Corporation P can move 
directly from that corporation to Corporation W or its shareholders, 
without :6.rst being transferred by Corporation P to Corporation A.41 
I. Acquisition of stock and liquidation of subsidiary. Whether 
the 1954 code merely "modi:6.es" or in fact "overrules" the Groman 
and Bashford decisions is a critical question. An obvious defect of the 
statute is its failure speci:6.cally to apply the new rules to "B" reorgan-
izations. Thus, where Corporation W stock received by Corporation 
P in a "B" reorganization is transferred by Corporation P to its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Corporation A1 as part of the plan of reorganization 
or within the contemplation thereof, the receipt by Corporation W 
shareholders of Corporation P voting stock will result in a taxable 
transaction.42 This may also be so even where Corporation W is 
forthwith dissolved pursuant to the plan (the Bashford case!). Like-
wise, a direct transfer to Corporation A of Corporation W stock in 
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P1 Corporation W then being 
dissolved (the Groman case!), may not qualify as a tax-free exchange. 
Indeed, of the examples set forth above, the new rules only apply 
speci:6.cally to change the results in examples 3 and 4. Nevertheless, 
it is probable that the courts will extend the new rules to cover 
examples I 1 2 and 5 as well. Since the end results in examples I 
through 5 are identical, the tax consequences should not be different. 
The statute should have been drafted to so provide in clear terms. As 
it is, taxpayers will have to rely upon a "step transaction" or "net effect" 
approach to have examples 11 2 and 5 ruled to be "C" reorganizations. 
40Because I.R.C. (1954), §368(c) defines "control" to mean "the ownership of stock 
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of 
stock of the corporation," the above rules apply only where the relationship of Corporation 
P and Corporation A is as so defined. In a transaction where there is any lesser degree of 
control of Corporation A by Corporation P, the Groman and Bashford rules continue to 
govern. 
41 In Davis v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, the Court of Claims 
held that the delivery by Corporation P of its stock directly to Corporation W was, "in 
legal contemplation," the same as the issuance by Corporation P of its stock to Corporation 
A and the delivery by Corporation A of Corporation P's stock to Corporation W in ex-
change for the latter's assets. Cf. note 23 supra. 
Query whether the basis of the assets acquired will depend upon which route is 
chosen to get Corporation P and Corporation A stock into the hands of Corporation W 
or its shareholders, or to get Corporation W assets into the hands of Corporation A. 
42ALI Draft, §X60I(c) and (d) provides a more desirable rule. Comment, February 
1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 311, illustrates the 
proposed rule as follows: " .•• assume Corporation A owns 10 per cent of the shares of 
Corporation X and Corporation B, which is in control of Corporation A, owns 30 per cent of 
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A step transaction approach has thus far been taken by the 
courts,43 so that where liquidation of a newly acquired subsidiary 
is part of a plan to acquire its assets, the preliminary exchange of stock 
will be disregarded and the transaction will be viewed as a corporate 
acquisition of assets. A somewhat troublesome feature, however, is 
that the Proposed Regulations completely ignore the problem. More-
over, the Internal Revenue Service has never withdrawn its non-
acquiescence in the Whittell44 case, despite a reliance upon that case 
in subsequent litigation where its result has been helpful to the govern-
ment's position.45 Also, there is some intimation in the Ways and 
Means Committee Report46 that a step transaction rule may not ordi-
narily be applied where a "corporate acquisition of stock" is followed 
by a "subsequent immediate liquidation" of the corporation whose stock 
is acquired. It would have been well if a speci:6.c statement had been 
the shares of X. The shareholders of X may transfer 25 per cent [or more] of their shares 
to A and 15 per cent [or more] to B. Likewise, on the other side of the transaction, the 
stock acquired by the transferring shareholders may be received directly by a corporation 
controlled by them." 
43 See George Whittell & Co., 34 '.B.T.A. 1070 (1936) (reviewed) non-acq. 1937-1 
Cum. Bui. 53 and 1939-2 Cum. Bui. 72; Mente & Co., 24 B.T.A. 401 (1931) (reviewed); 
Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949) (reviewed), affd. (6th Cir. 
1951) 187 F: (2d) 826; WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); Ahles Realty Corp. v. 
Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 150, cert. den. 293 U.S. 611, 55 S.Ct. 141 
(1934); Commissioner v. Dana, (3d Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 359 (alternate holding 
under 1928 act). See also White, "Avoiding Pitfalls in Acquiring a Subsidiary Under 
Section 112(g)(l)(B)," N.Y.U. 8TH ANmrAL lNsTITUTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 193 at 
200 (1950); Mintz and Plumb, "Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," N.Y.U. 
12TH ANmrAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 247 at 283 (1954); 3 MERTENS, LAw oP 
FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION §20.76 (1942). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §334(b)(2), which 
treats a corporate acquisition of stock by "purchase," followed by a liquidation of the 
acquired corporation, as a direct purchase of the assets of the acquired corporation for 
purposes of determining the basis to the transferee of the acquired assets. Kimbell-Diamond 
Milling Co. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 718, affirming 10 T.C. 7 
(1948), cert. den. 342 U.S. 827, 72 S.Ct. 50 (1951). 
44 Note 43 supra. It is not clear why these are two non-acquiescences in this case, 
which involved a taxable year prior to the enactment of the tax-free liquidation of a 
subsidiary provision. See Revenue Act of 1934, §112(b)(6), as added by 1935 Act, §110; 
1936 Act, 1938 Act and I.R.C. (1939), §ll2(b)(6); I.R.C. (1954), §332. 
45 E.g., Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Ry. Co., 13 T.C. 486 (1949), affd. (6th Cir. 
1951) 187 F. (2d) 826. 
46 House Report, p. Al 28, first full paragraph, indicating a need for a special basis 
rule to get a "step transaction" result. See also Senate Report, p. 48, re the codilication of 
the Kimbell-Diamond rule by I.R.C. (1954), §334(b)(2). See note 43 supra. 
Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, "The Internal Revenue Code of 
1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations," 68 HARv. L. REv. 
393 at 415, n. 167 (1955), find "an appreciable amount of indirect support" for a "step 
transaction" rule in a passage in the Conference Committee Report [H. Rep. 2543, 83d 
Cong., 2d sess., at 41 (1954)]. Taxpayers may find less comfort than do the five authors 
in the passage, which deals with a tax avoidance device (liquidation followed by reincor-
poration). 
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made in the Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committee Reports47 
to the effect that it is intended that the new "party to a reorganization" 
rules cover step transactions having the effect of "C" reorganizations.48 
Perhaps the £nal Regulations will recognize the existence of the "step 
transaction" rule so that a corporate acquisition of assets which is imme-
diately preceded by a corporate acquisition of stock will benefit from the 
'i>tatutory alleviation of the harsh Groman and Bashford rules. 
2. Division of transferred assets between parent and subsidiary 
corporation in "C" reorganization. That the statutory modification of 
the Groman and Bashford rules was not adequately accomplished by 
the legislative draftsmen is further indicated by the provision that a 
transaction otherwise qualifying under the "C" reorganization defini-
tion shall not be disqualified ''by reason of the fact that part or all of 
the assets which were acquired in the transaction are transferred to a 
corporation49 controlled by the corporation acquiring such assets."50 
It would appear from a strict reading of this language that Corporation 
P must be used as a conduit if it is desired to transfer part of Corpora-
tion W s assets to Corporation P and the remainder to Corporation A; 
a transfer directly to Corporation A of part of Corporation W's assets 
47 Cf. Statement of A. W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, 
prepared for the use of the members of the House Committee on Ways and Means, :in 
connection with the Treasury Draft of the Revenue Bill of 1924: 
"A corporation :in connection with a reorganization may dispose of its assets :in one of 
three ways: It may transfer them to a new corporation :in exchange for stock or cash; it 
may transfer them to the new corporation, the consideration being the payment by the new 
corporation of stock or cash to the stockholders of the old corporation; or the new corpora-
tion may buy, with its stock and cash, from the stockholders of the old corporation their 
stock, and then liquidate the old corporation. • •• subdivision (E) [predecessor to I.R.C. 
(1954), §36l(b)] has been so drafted that the tax liability on the selling corporation is 
the same, no matter which of the three methods set out above is adopted. • • ." The 
NBw Yorur T1MEs, January 5, 1924, p. 8:4. 
48 Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(A), which specifically treats "C" reorganizations 
which also meet the "D" requirements as "D" reorganizations; ALI Draft, §X60l(b), 
discussed :in Comment, February 1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, 
Vol. II, pp. 310-311, which requires that a transaction be treated as a recapitalization rather 
than a "B" reorganization wherever the shareholders of a transferor corporation have "a 
50 per centum stock interest" [the Comment at p. 311 refers to this as "voting control"] 
of the acquiring corporation immediately after the transaction. The term "stock :interest" 
is defined :in ALI Draft, §X500(f). 
49 Query whether "a corporation" must be read "a single corporation," or whether 
it can be read "a corporation or corporations." Cf. Tulsa Oxygen Co., 18 B.T.A. 1283 
(1930), a pre-Groman decision, where Corporation A transferred its assets to Corporations 
C, D and E, subsidiaries of Corporation B, under a contract with Corporation C, for 
shares of stock :in Corporation B, paid by Corporation D. The Board of Tax Appeals held 
that this was a tax-free reorganization, implying that Corporation B was a party thereto. 
See Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, (3d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 787 at 
789. 
50 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(C). 
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and a transfer to Corporation P of the remainder may not qualify as a 
"C" reorganization, and gain or loss may be fully recognized in such a 
transaction. 51 
The distinction between a direct and an indirect transfer of part 
of Corporation W's assets to Corporation A can be a real one to the 
corporations involved. It is one which cannot easily be dismissed, 
even apart from the unreasonable duplication of real estate transfer 
taxes and other burdens which may be occasioned by an indirect 
transfer. For example, there may be provisions in a loan agreement 
which would prevent any transfer of the parent's fixed assets without 
the lender's approval, and in particular cases such approval may not 
be forthcoming. Perhaps in such a situation, where the assets of 
Corporation W are to be divided between a parent and a subsidiary, a 
net effect:52 or inverse step transaction rule may permit the solution 
( where non-tax circumstances require this course) of Corporation W 
first transferring its entire assets to Corporation A, and then Corpora-
tion A immediately transferring a part of those assets to Corporation P. 
This approach is favored by at least two court decisions under prior 
law, although it perhaps may not be available now because of the 
precise language used in the 1954 code. 
In Gertrude B. Chase53 Republic Steel Company desired to obtain 
a controlling stock in interest in Truscon Steel Company. Because of 
a restriction in a mortgage on Republic's property, Republic found it 
could not directly acquire the stock of Truscon Steel without thereby 
preventing the latter from issuing securities or borrowing money. Re--
public therefore formed a new subsidiary, Truscon Holding Company,. 
to acquire and hold the stock of Truscon Steel (thus avoiding applica• 
51 ALI Draft, §X602(d) presents a more sensible rule. Comment, February 1954 
Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 315, illustrates the proposed 
rule as follows: "Under this Draft, Corporation A may transfer all or part of its properties 
to Corporation B and the remainder to Corporation C which is in control of Corporation B 
in exchange for ••• C's shares. It will be noted, however, that under this Draft the trans-
feror may receive only stock of the parent." An equivalent provision (applying only where 
Corporation Bis wholly owned by Corporation C) was contained in §125 of H.R. 7738, 
81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950), introduced by Representative Camp at the request of the Tax 
Section of the American Bar Association. See the discussion in Part IV infra as to whose 
stock may be received. 
52Cf. Gunby, Inc. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 203; Thurber v. 
Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 815; Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371, 383 (1943), 
affd. (9th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 376, cert. den. 325 U.S. 868, 65 S.Ct. 1405 (1945). 
But cf. Woodworth v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 719. See the state-
ment of Judge Hill, made in another connection, in Herbert G. Hanan, 3 T.C.M. 670 at 
672, July 7, 1944: " ••• If a bridge is out [standing] to a traveler going from north to 
south, it is likewise out [standing] to a traveler going from south to north." 
53 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941) (reviewed) non-acq. 1941-l Cum. Bul. 13; 1942-1 Cum. Bul. 
20, affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 740. 
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tion of the restriction) until the restriction was terminated through the 
satisfaction of the mortgage. Pursuant to an exchange offer the taxpayer 
turned over her stock in T ruscon Steel to T ruscon Holding Company 
and received in exchange therefor stock of Republic. About a year 
later, after the mortgage was satisfied, Truscon Holding Company was 
merged into Republic. T ruscon Steel was thereafter operated as a 
subsidiary of· Republic. 
The Chase case decided that the temporary holding of the T ruscon 
Steel stock by Republic's wholly-owned subsidiary did not prevent 
the treatment of the exchange as a nontaxable reorganization. The 
Board of Tax Appeals found that the intermediate step whereby 
Republic's subsidiary held the T ruscon Steel stock was merely trans-
itory, and was to be given no weight. This decision was affirmed per 
curiam by the Second Circuit. The same result was reached by the 
Sixth Circuit in the companion Margaret Kahn54 case, which relied in 
part "upon the application of principles discussed by us in Commissioner 
v. Ashland & Refining Co . ... " In other words, a "net effect" 
and "step transaction" rule was applied-the substantial result which 
was intended by both parties to the transaction, and which in fact was 
effectuated, was a transfer of stock to Republic. 
Suppose that in the Chase case it had been the intention of 
Republic to acquire all of the assets of T ruscon Steel and then to 
transfer a part of such assets to a newly-formed subsidiary. Should the 
fact that non-tax considerations would cause Republic to alter the 
mechanics of the transaction and have the newly-formed subsidiary first 
receive the assets, with a transfer to Republic at the earliest opportunity 
of those assets wanted by Republic, cause the transaction to fall out-
side of the new "C" reorganization definition? Since the Internal 
Revenue Service still nonacquiesces in the result in the Chase case and 
the Proposed Regulations ignore the existence of a net effect rule, 
apparently certainty will be achieved readily only through a clarifying 
amendment to the statute. It would appear that Congress never 
intended in this situation to spell out a detailed order of transfers, for 
such an attempt "would make it difficult for necessary business trans-
actions to be carried out with a minimum degree of interference 
from the tax laws."55 
3. Assumption of liabilities of transferor in "C" reorganization. 
Another aspect of the net effect problem appears in the application of 
54 Commissioner v. Kahn, (6th Cir. 1942) 133 F. (2d) 199. 
55 Cf. Senate Report, p. 42. 
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the assumption of liability provisions governing Groman-type "C" re-
organizations. There is a "C" reorganization where substantially all 
of the assets of Corporation W are transferred to Corporation P in 
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P and the assumption of 
Corporation W's liabilities by Corporation P, even though the latter 
forthwith transfers all or a part of Corporation W's assets to Corpora-
tion A.116 The assumption of Corporation Ws liabilities in such 
circumstances does not prevent the exchange from being treated as 
an exchange of assets "solely" for voting stock. However, should the 
statutory language be explicitly followed there would be no transfer 
of assets "solely" for voting stock if the assets of Corporation W are 
transferred directly to Corporation A and if Corporation P (in order to 
"dress up" the subsidiary's balance sheet, for example) assumes the 
liabilities of Corporation W in addition to giving its voting stock. 
Nevertheless, since one procedure has received legislative sanction, a 
less cumbersome and more direct procedure having the same net result 
should a fortiori be permitted. The Proposed Regulations do not find 
a constructive indirect:57 transfer in such cases. This is regrettable, 
for if a parent is permitted to assume a liability of the transferor in a 
two-step transaction but not in a one-step transaction, there will be 
situations where reorganizations will be unduly complicated and costly, 
and in some instances prevented entirely, because of the artificial tax 
strictures of section 368(a) as so interpreted. 
The other side of the coin is that unless the same end result arrived 
at by different routes has a uniformly applied tax consequence, section 
368(a)(l)(C) may provide a loophole where the transferor corpora-
tion or its shareholders sustains a loss upon the transfer. The transferor 
may be able deliberately to cause the loss to be recognized through the 
device of transferring substantially all of its assets directly to a sub-
sidiary whose parent assumes the transferor's liabilities, such as its 
accounts payable, unsecured notes payable or debentures.58 The 
courts have said on numerous occasions that the substance of a trans-
action, rather than its mere form, controls tax liability. "A given 
result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because 
reached by following a devious path."59 But here it is the devious 
116 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(C) and (2)(C). 
111 Cf. Davis v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 1007, note 41 supra; 
Gertrude B. Chase, 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941), note 53 supra. 
ISB There are of course other ways in which recognition of loss can be achieved by the 
transferor or its shareholders. Because of the new 80% - 20% rule of I.R.C. (1954), 
§368(a)(2)(B), it is somewhat more difficult than under the 1939 code to achieve this 
result through the giving of some "boot" to the transferor. 
ISO Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 at 613, 58 S.Ct. 393 (1938). 
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(two-step) path which the words of the statute requires for non-
recognition of loss (or gain). A sensible interpretive approach would 
be to prevent a recognized loss from being achieved where a trans-
action takes a straight (one-step) path which reaches the same destina-
tion as does the long way round. It would avoid controversy and 
litigation if the situation were clarified by future legislation. 
II. AcQu1srnoN OF STOCK "SoLELY" FOR VoTING STOCK 
The 1939 code60 defined a "B" reorganization as "the acquisition 
by one corporation in exchange solely for all or a pait of its voting 
stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per 
centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of 
another corporation . . . ." The House Bill61 substituted for this 
the concept of a "corporate acquisition of stock," which it defined, 
subject to two limitations, as "the acquisition in a single transaction, 
by one corporation, in exchange for all or part of its participating 
stock, 62 of stock of another corporation . . . ." The £rst limitation 
required that "immediately after the acquisition the acquiring corpora-
tion has 'control' of such other [acquired] corporations ( whether or 
not such acquiring corporation had control immediately prior to the 
acquisition)." The second required that a "relative size" (also called 
the "4 to I") requirement be met.63 
60 Section 112(g)(l)(B). 
61 Section 359(b). Cf. American Law Institute Income Tax Project, February 1954 
Draft, §X601, entitled "Corporate Acquisitions of Stock." 
62 ''Participating stock," as defined in House Bill, §312(b), was generally the 
garden variety of ·common stock, whether voting or nonvoting. See House Report, p. A98. 
Thus, the House Bill did not contain a solely for voting stock requirement. 
Cf. American Law Institute Income Tax Project, February 1954 Draft, §§X601(a) 
and X602(a), which drop the solely for voting stock requirement of the ''B" and "C'' 
reorganization definitions in favor of a voting or nonvoting stock requirement. Although 
the Reporters view the "solely" for voting stock rule as "inconsequential," they deem the 
proportion of total voting stock held after the transfer by the shareholders of the transferor 
as "significant." As they phrase it, "it is believed that where the percentage of voting 
power in the acquiring corporation represented by the exchanged shares exceeds a certain 
figure, the transaction may properly be viewed as a reorganization rather than as a sale .••• 
While a decision of this sort is necessarily arbitrary, ••• [20%] commends itself as most 
indicative of the fact that a reorganization, rather than a sale, has occurred." Comment, 
February 1954 Draft, American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, p. 312. See 
also p. 309. 
An alternative provision in the February 1954 Draft is that a corporate acquisition 
of stock or property will qualify as a reorganization regardless of changes in voting power 
if the transferors receive stock valued at 20% or more of the value of all the acquiring 
corporation's outstanding stock, for "where a corporation exchanges stock of its own of a 
sufficiently high value for the stock [property] of a second corporation, the transaction 
may properly be viewed as a reorganization rather than a single purchase by the acquiring 
corporation from the transferors •••• " Id. at pp. 309-310, 313. 
63 This requirement attempted to come to grips with the "continuity of interest'' 
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A "B" reorganization under the 1954 code is in essence a "corporate 
acquisition of stock" under the House Bill, but without the "relative 
size" requirement, and without a specific reference to the stock being 
acquired in "a single transaction."64 Section 368(a)(l)(B) defines 
" . . ,, as a reorgamzation 
" ... the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely 
for all or a part of its voting stock, of stock of another corporation 
if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation 
has control65 of such other corporation ( whether or not such 
acquiring corporation had control immediately before the acquisi-
. ) " tion .... 
The parenthetical expression, retained from the House Bill, is 
the so-called "creeping control" amendment. In effect, the "creeping 
control" amendment treats as acquired in exchange for voting stock, 
for "B" reorganization purposes, any stock of a corporation which is 
acquired by another corporation prior to the transaction which results 
in the latter acquiring (solely for its voting stock) sufficient additional 
problem by providing a statutory definition. See SoMMARY OF H.R. 8300, THE PROPOSED 
INTERNAL REVENUE ConE oF 1954 As PASSED BY THE HoosE oF REPRESENTATIVES, which 
was prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Finance by the technical staff of the 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on 
Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R. 8300, Part 1, pp. 1, 33 (April 7 and 8, 1954). It was 
rejected by the Senate Finance Committee after strong opposition voiced at the Hearings 
on H.R. 8300 held before that committee. See, for example, Statement of Thomas N. Tar-
leau, Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Finance, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R. 8300, Part 1, p. 325 
et seq. (April 7 and 8, 1954); Statement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
on H.R. 8300, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d sess., on H.R. 
8300, Part 4, pp. 1945, 1956-1957 (April 22 and 23, 1954). 
It is interesting to note that the Ways and Means Committee Report nowhere men-
tions the "continuity of interest" requirement in connection with corporation acquisitions 
of stock or property. Neither does the Comment, February 1954 Draft, American Law 
Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, pp. 311-315, with respect to ALI Draft, §X602 
("C'' reorganizations), although it specifically states at p. 311 that "no continuity of inter-
est" rule is superimposed upon ALI Draft, §X601 (''B" reorganizations). See note 62 
supra. See also Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, "A Technical Revision of the Federal 
Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders,'' 52 Cor.. L. REv. 1 
at 47 (1952). 
64 This last omission was probably due to an oversight. Cf. Senate Report, p. 273. 
65 I.R.C. (1954), §368(c) defines "control" as "the ownership of stock possessing at 
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of swck entitled to vote 
and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the 
corporation." (Italics supplied.) Thus, the extent of the stock required to be obtained in 
a "B" reorganization under the 1954 code differs somewhat from the 1939 code requirement. 
Note that 80% of each class of voting stock of the acquired corporation is not needed. 
As to nonvoting stock, only 80% of the total number of shares of all classes of nonvoting 
stock is needed, without regard to fair market values. Cf. Comment, February 1954 Draft, 
American Law Institute Income Tax Project, Vol. II, pp. 309-310, discussing ALI Draft, 
§X601(a)(2). See note 62 supra. 
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shares of the former to give it "control." Stated more simply, if 
Corporation A purchases 30 percent of the common stock (the only 
class of stock outstanding) of Corporation W for cash in 1955, and 
thereafter in a separate transaction in 1956 acquires an additional 60 
percent of the common stock of Corporation W for its own voting 
stock, no gain or loss will be recognized with respect to the exchange 
in 1956 because the "B" reorganization requirements will be met. 
Under the 1939 code, this would not have been so because the original 
30 percent had not been acquired solely for Corporation A's voting 
stock.66 
The Senate Finance Committee obviously intended to liberalize 
the old law by extending the scope of the "B" reorganization defini-
tion. However, the Proposed Regulations narrow the interpretation 
made by the old Regulations in an important respect. 67 
The 1939 code required the acquisition "of at least 80 per centum 
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number 
of shares of other classes of stock of another corporation," and such 
acquisition had to be solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the 
acquiring corporation. The Regulations68 under the 1939 code merely 
require that the acquisition by the acquiring corporation "of the 
required amount of the stock" of the acquired corporation "must be 
in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the acquiring 
corporation." Presumably, if in a single transaction Corporation A 
acquired 80 percent of Corporation W's common stock (the only class 
outstanding) for part of its own voting stock, it could acquire additional 
shares of Corporation W s common stock for cash without prejudicing 
the· treatment of the transaction as a "B" reorganization. In fact, the 
66 Robert A. Pulfer, 43 B.T.A. 677 (1941), affd. (6th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 742. 
Cf. Mahlon D. Thatcher, 46 B.T.A. 869 at 880-881 (1942), revd. on other grounds sub 
nom. Commissioner v. Huntzinger, (10th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 128. 
67 In addition, Proposed Regulations, § I.368-3(a) perpetuate the (to my mind) 
erroneous interpretation of Treas. Reg. ll8, §39.ll2(g)-6, that the corporation whose 
stock is being acquired must actually adopt the plan of reorganization. This requirement, 
which has no statutory basis, first appeared in Treas. Reg. 86, art. ll2(g)-6(a) (1934 
Act). That the Proposed Regulations are invalid is evident from the discussion in Groman 
v. Commissioner [302 U.S. 82 at 87, 58 S.Ct. 108 (1937)] of 1928 Act, §ll2(i)(2), 
which corresponds to I.R.C. (1954), §368(h)(2) ("Indiana, as such, was not a party to 
any agreement and took no corporate action." Nevertheless Indiana was found to be a 
"party to the reorganization."). But cf. Mahlon D. Thatcher, note 66 supra. See Merritt, 
"Tax-Free Acquisition of Corporate Business," N.Y.U. 13TH .ANNuAL INsnTUTB ON 
FEDERAL TAXATION 693 at 725-727 (1955) for a further discussion of this problem. 
BS Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-2(c). This provision first appeared in Treas. Reg. 86, 
art. 112(g)-2, interpreting the 1934 Act. Cf. Stockton Harbor Industrial Co. v. Com· 
missioner, (9th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 638 at 645, cert. den. (U.S. 1955) 75 S.Ct. 581: 
''The only properties which can be considered are those exchanged,-one for the other." 
("C" reorganization.) 
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Senate Finance Committee Report seems to recognize this by stating 
that under the 1939 code one corporation could "acquire enough stock 
of another corporation to get control of the second corporation solely 
for its own voting stock" under a tax-free "B" reorganization.69 Never-
theless, as we shall see, the described result was uncertain under the 
1939 code. 
The 1954 code presents its own problems of interpretation. Sec-
tion 368(a)(l)(B) describes a general situation, i.e., the acquisition, 
in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of an acquiring 
corporation, of stock of another corporation. It then states that such 
an exchange will constitute a "B" reorganization "if, immediately 
after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such 
other corporation ( whether or not such acquiring corporation had 
control immediately before the acquisition)." This is interpreted by 
the following example given in section l.368-2(c) of the Proposed 
Regulations: "If, for example, Corporation X, in one transaction 
exchanges nonvoting preferred stock or bonds in addition to all or a 
part of its voting stock in the acquisition oP0 stock of Corporation Y, 
the transaction is not a reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(B)." 
It would appear that a justifiable and perhaps more proper interpre-
tation of section 368(a)(l)(B) is the following: "If in one transaction 
Corporation X exchanges all or a part of its voting stock in the acquisi-
tion of stock of Corporation Y, which acquisition gives Corporation X 
'control' of Corporation Y, then the transaction will be treated as a 
reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(B) even though in the same 
or a previous or later transaction Corporation X acquires or acquired 
additional shares of stock of Corporation Y for its nonvoting preferred 
stock or bonds, or cash or other boot." 
If the Treasury should ultimately accept this interpretation, it may 
seek to put an overall limitation on "creeping control" situations by 
providing that if in the transaction which the .taxpayer wishes to qualify 
as a "B" reorganization there is boot given in exchange for a part of 
the stock of Corporation Y, then there will be a "B" reorganization 
69 Emphasis added. No authoritative interpretation indicates whether the 80% 
control could be acquired through the "tacking on" of several acquisitions made solely for 
voting stock, but the consensus seems to be that it could. See Cohn, "What Is Meant by 
'Control Immediately After the Transfer' in the Tax-Free Reorganization and Exchange 
Provisions'?" N.Y.U. 8TH AmroAL lNsnTaTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 129 at 133 (1950); 
Darrell, "Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954," 32 TAXEs 1007 at 1012-1013 (1954). Cf. Hendricks, ''Federal Income Tax: 
Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 45 HA:av. L. REv. 648 at 654-655 (1932) (1928 Act). 
70 At this point Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(g)-2(c) contain the words "the required 
amount of." See note 68 supra. 
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only if the stock constituting "control" was in fact acquired solely 
for voting stock of Corporation X. However, to be consistent in 
interpretation, it would seem that even here the prior acquired stock 
should be treated under the 1954 code as if acquired solely for voting 
stock, and that in the transaction which the taxpayer seeks to qualify 
as a "B" reorganization only sufficient additional stock to constitute 
"controf' need be acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation Y. 
Of course, only the latter transaction would constitute an exchange as 
to which gain or loss is not recognized. The import of the "single trans-
action" concept in such a situation would be that only such stock as is 
acquired solely for voting stock in the single transaction which brings 
about "control" would be exchanged tax-free. Caution would indicate 
the avoidance of a single transaction wherein both voting stock and 
boot is given by Corporation X, and where the stock of Corporation Y 
acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation X is not sufficient in 
itself to bring about a meeting of the "control" definition. 
Because of the intent to liberalize the "B" and "C" reorganization 
definitions by the 1954 code, interpretations made of earlier law with 
respect to the acquisition "solely" for voting stock requirement are not 
to be regarded as precedents in interpreting section 368(a)(l)(B). 
Moreover, it is my opinion that the only court decision under prior 
law which deals with the particular phase of that requirement under 
discussion here is inconclusive if not incorrect. In Commissioner 11. 
Air Reduction Co.71 Corporation A acquired all 132,299 shares of 
Corporation W's outstanding stock through acquiring 87,275 shares 
for its own voting stock and 7,906 shares for cash prior to 1935, and 
acquired 14,771 shares for cash and 22,347 shares for its own voting 
stock (treasury shares) in 1935. Although 82.6 percent of Corpora-
tion W's shares were acquired for voting stock, the Second Circuit, 
reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, held that the acquisition of the 
22,347 shares did not constitute a "B" reorganization under the 1934 
Act and that Corporation A realized gain on the exchange of its treas-
ury shares. 
The Second Circuit's opinion was predicated principally on the 
ground that Corporation A was dealing in its treasury shares as it 
would in the shares of another corporation.72 However, it also held 
to be untenable the taxpayer's alternative contention that there was a 
11 (2d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 145, revg. and remanding 1941 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 
Dec. ,r41,266, May 19, 1941, cert. den. 317 U.S. 681, 63 S.Ct. 201 (1942). 
12 Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 2 T.C. 827 (1943), appeal to 6th Circuit dis-
missed June 19, 1944. But see I.R.C. (1954), §§362(b) and 1032. 
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"B" reorganization, for according to the Second Circuit the statutory 
definition under the prior law "contemplates only situations where 
the exchange is made 'solely' for voting stock. Here over 17 percent 
of the Pure Carbonic stock was purchased for cash. Cf. Helvering v. 
Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 62 S. Ct. 546 .... "73 
The comparison of the facts in the Air Reduction case with those in 
Southwest Consolidated was not an apt one. Southwest Consolidated 
Corporation had acquired all the properties of a bankrupt corporation 
in exchange for a part of its voting stock, stock warrants, and the pay-
ment of cash to certain creditors of the bankrupt corporation. The 
cash was raised during the reorganization on a loan from a bank. The 
Supreme Court held that under the particular facts, the substance 
of the transaction was precisely the same as if Southwest Consolidated 
had paid cash plus voting stock and stock warrants for the properties. 
Moreover, the stock warrants which were issued were held not to be 
"voting stock." There was thus no meeting of the applicable re-
organization requirement that substantially all the properties of one 
corporation be acquired solely for all or a part of the voting stock of the 
acquiring corporation. 
Some recent decisions indicate that had substantially all the trans-
feror corporation's property in the Southwest Consolidated case been 
acquired solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation, with an 
inconsequential portion of the properties of the transferor being used 
to satisfy the claims of nonassenting creditors, a "C" reorganization 
would have been found.74 A corresponding interpretation should be 
d f th "B" · · · Th "B" · ma e o e reorganization reqmrements. e reorganiza-
tion definition contemplates that as little as 80 percent "control," and 
no more, can be acquired by the acquiring corporation in a "B" re-
organization solely for voting stock. If this can be done in a tax-free 
transaction by the giving of voting stock of Corporation A, even though 
20 percent of the stock of Corporation W is not acquired by Corpora-
tion A, it makes no sense to destroy the tax-free nature of the exchange 
73130 F. (2d) 145 at 148. Judge Learned Hand, who dissented on the main point, 
did not mention this portion of the majority's opinion. The only portion of the govern• 
ment's brief which dealt with this question was a footnote (p. 21) that there was not a 
tax-free reorganization "because both cash and taxpayer's own shares were used in the 
acquisition," citing the Southwest Consolidated Corp. decision. 
Query whether the Second Circuit majority was inHuenced not only by the treasury 
stock aspect of the case, but also by the fact that all the additional shares acquired in 1935 
were acquired from one stockholder, without any written plan of reorganization being 
adopted. Cf. William Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930), note 81 infra. 
74Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 399 at 408 (1948) (reviewed) acq. 1950-1 Cum. 
Bul. 4; Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 at 850 (1945) (reviewed) acq. 1946-1 Cum. Bul. 4. 
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by penalizing the parties to the qualifying exchange because in the 
same transaction, or in a prior or contemporaneous transaction, some 
of the remaining 20 percent is acquired for boot: 
For example, Corporation A might desire to acquire all of the 
common stock (the only class outstanding) of Corporation W. It feels 
that 80 percent or more of the shareholders of Corporation W would 
be willing to exchange their shares in a tax-free exchange for a part 
of its own voting stock, but that some small minority would not accept 
an exchange offer, although they would be likely to accept a cash offer 
resulting in recognized capital gain (or loss) to them.75 Assuming the 
problem of settling the conditions of the cash· offer is met so that an 
undue number of shareholders are not encouraged to request cash, and 
yet the terms are such that all, or almost all, of the stock is gotten in 
hand, why should the otherwise qualifying tax-free reorganization be 
penalized because some shareholders choose to take cash for their 
shares? It is submitted that such a transaction is probably permitted 
under section 368(a)(l)(B) of the 1954 code. To hold otherwise 
would be to treat the 1954 code as a patchwork quilt with no organized 
pattern. 
I think we are justified in assuming that the basic congressional 
aims with respect to "B" and "C" reorganizations are the same-if 
Corporation A acquires substantially all of the properties (or 80 percent 
under the 80 percent-20 percent rule76) of Corporation W, or stock rep-
resenting 80 percent "control" of Corporation W, in exchange solely for 
all or a part of its voting stock, then Corporation W or its shareholders 
are considered to have retained a sufficient continuity of interest in 
the business enterprise conducted by Corporation W to warrant the 
application of the tax-free reorganization rules. It is doubtful that 
Congress intended that if in a single transaction Corporation A acquires 
80 percent of Corporation W's common stock (the only class outstand-
ing) and in the same or a contemporaneous transaction acquires the 
75 Cf. Daisy M. Ward, 2.9 B.T.A. 1251 (1934) (reviewed) non-acq. XIlI-1 Cum. 
Bul. 31 (1934), petition for review dismissed (8th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 381, where a 
repurchase by Corporation A of its stock, upon demand of Corporation W shareholders, 
pursuant to an agreement giving them an option to sell, was held to be a separate transac-
tion; The Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 at 950 (1934), affd. (3d Cir. 
1936) 84 F. (2d) 787. 
The problems involved when dealing with minority shareholders who want cash 
are discussed (with particular reference to the 1928 Act) in M!Lum, HENDRICKS AND 
EVBllE'lT, RBoaGANIZAnoNs AND Ormm ExCHANoES IN FEDERAL lNcoME TAXAnoN 112-
114 (1931). 
16 See Part ill(A) infra. 
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remaining 20 percent for cash, this will disqualify the reorganization 
from tax-free status. I suppose the Treasury could contend that where 
a particular shareholder of Corporation W exchanges some of his 
stock for voting stock and some for cash, this should be treated as 
an exchange of Corporation W stock, considered as a unit, for voting 
stock plus cash, thus violating the solely for voting stock requirement.77 
But the terms of the exchange can be made such that the stock given 
up cannot readily be so unitized.78 Moreover, as a practical matter, 
it is not likely that a shareholder who elects to take voting stock will 
also elect to take some boot which could be taxable as ordinary in-
come.79 
But even apart from these reasons, there is an even more obvious 
reason for regarding the Proposed Regulations as ill-conceived. Under 
the "creeping control" amendment 20 percent, or indeed any larger or 
smaller percentage, of Corporation W's stock can be acquired for cash 
or other boot, and if a subsequent exchange yielding 80 percent "con-
trol" is made solely for voting stock of Corporation A, the latter ex-
change constitutes a "B" reorganization. Surely, the fact that a part of 
Corporation W's stock is acquired for boot contemporaneously with 
or in the same transaction as that in which 80 percent or more of its 
stock is acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation A, should not 
disqualify the "B" reorganization, when giving equivalent boot in 
either an earlier or a later separate transaction would not prevent the 
exchange from being tax-free. If these transactions are not to be ac-
corded similar treatment under the 1954 code, then legislative action 
would seem indicated to state clearly an 80-20 percent rule applicable 
to "B" reorganization in the same manner that such a rule now governs 
"C" reorganizations.80 They day should come when the Internal Reve-
nue Code is a well-ordered universe. 
77 Cf. Treusch, "Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders 
of Some Old Problems Under the New Code," 32 TAXEs 1023 at 1030, n. 93 and text to 
n. 104 (1954). The extreme of this view is that a reorganization would not qualify as 
tax-free where a corporation purchases a single share of stock of another corporation for 
cash and simultaneously acquires all the remaining shares of stock of such corporation in 
exchange for a part of its voting stock. 
78 Cf. Harlow W. Davock, 20 T.C. 1075 (1953); Owen v. United States, (D.C. 
Neb. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 855. 
79 See I.R.C. (1954), §356(a)(2). 
80 Cf. the history of the Revenue Act of 1921. Originally the Senate Finance Com-
mittee proposed that an acquisition of stock should include substantially all the stock, just 
as an acquisition of property under that act required that substantially all the properties 
be acquired. On the Senate floor, an amendment was made to require merely the acqui-
sition of a majority of the voting stock and a majority of the total number of shares of all 
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Where the stock acquired for cash is purchased from shareholders 
of Corporation W who do not exchange other stock of Corporation W 
for voting stock of Corporation A, the issue is clear-cut, for the "unitiza-
tion" argument is not available to the.Treasury. If the exchange offer 
which constitutes the plan of reorganization only invites an exchange of 
stock of Corporation W for voting stock of Corporation A, and apart 
from the plan the latter purchases some stock of Corporation W for 
cash, it would appear that this would constitute a transaction separate 
from the reorganization81 even though consummated during the period 
of the exchange offer. It is inconceivable that this cash purchase 
should destroy the tax-free character of the exchanges made under the 
reorganization plan, whereunder in an unrelated "single transaction"82 
Corporation A acquires "control" of Corporation W solely in exchange 
for a part of Corporation A's voting stock. 
Interestingly enough, in the really close case, the Service has used 
a fiction to help bring a reorganization within the "B" reorganization 
definition. Recently Standard Oil Company, which had acquired 
72.32 percent of the outstanding common stock (the only class out-
standing) of Humble Oil & Refining Company in prior years, offered 
to the minority shareholders of Humble the opportunity to exchange 
ten shares of Humble common stock for nine shares of voting stock of 
Standard. The offer was conditional upon Humble shareholders ten-
dering sufficient shares for exchange by November 30, 1954 to give 
Standard 80 percent control of Humble.83 No fractional shares were 
other classes of stock of the acquired corporation. The Senate Hoor discussion indicates 
conflicting views as to the purpose of the amendment. See BAAB. AND Moruus, HmDBN 
TAXEs IN CoRPoRATB REonGANIZATioNs 56-57 (1935); 61 CoNG. REc. 6561-6567 (Oct. 
21, 1921); Conference Committee Report on Revenue Bill of 1921, H. Rep. 486, 67th 
Cong., 1st sess., at 17-18, 1939-1 Cum. Bul. (Part 2) 206, 209 (Amendment 47); G.C.M. 
8565, IX-2 Cum. Bul. 127 (1930). 
s1 Cf. William Hewitt, 19 B.T.A. 771 (1930) (reviewed), appeal dismissed (8th 
Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 1011. Pursuant to a plan of reorganization Corporation A offered to 
exchange $40 in cash, one-half a share of its preferred stock and one share of its common 
stock for each share of common stock tendered by Corporation W's shareholders. Hewitt did 
not accept the exchange offer, but negotiated a more advantageous exchange with Corpora-
tion A. This individual deal was held not to be part of the plan of reorganization which 
otherwise qualified under the 1926 Act. 
82 The meaning of this phrase is discusse4 in House Report, pp. Al32-Al33. 
83 The purpose of the exchange was to enable Standard to take advantage of the new 
"control" rule of I.R.C. (1954), §l504(a), which reduces from 95% to 80% the percentage 
ownership of an affiliated corporation required in connection with the filing of a consoli-
dated return. 
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issued, but in lieu thereof any shareholder who deposited a number 
of shares not divisible by ten was given the option either to sell his 
interest in less than one share of Standard or to purchase an interest 
sufficient to entitle him to one additional full share of Standard.84 
Standard engaged and paid an agent to perform "the necessary minis-
terial functions attendant to effectuating the exchange of Standard 
stock for Humble stock, including the sale or purchase of fractional 
interests." 
Before consummating the exchange, Standard obtained a Treasury 
ruling85 that the handling of the fractional shares did not prevent the 
transaction from qualifying as a "B" reorganization under the 1954 
code. 86 The ruling states, "It will be considered that the stockholders 
actually received any fractional shares to which they were entitled. 
Upon the sale of any fractional share by the exchange agent for the 
account of a particular stockholder, such stockholder will realize gain 
or loss measured by the difference between the amount received for 
such fractional share and the cost or other basis of his stock of Humble 
properly allocable to the fractional share of Standard stock sold .... " 
Note that the agent, paid in cash by and acting for Standard, is 
apparently treated as the agent of the Humble shareholders for the 
purpose of receiving fractional (and other) shares of Standard and 
selling the fractional shares for cash.87 One explanation for the 
favorable Treasury attitude is that Standard gave up solely a part 
of its voting stock, and the statute is framed in terms of what the 
acquiring corporation gives up, rather than what the shareholders 
of the acquired corporation actually take down. This ignores the fact 
that the agent was paid in cash and if it acted on behalf of the share-
holders, then some cash was paid by Standard to the benefit of the 
shareholders; if the agent acted solely on behalf of Standard then in 
effect Standard sold the fractional shares and paid a small amount of 
cash to some of Humble's shareholders. Either explanation of the 
agent's role presents difficulties. The very fact that the Treasury will 
accommodate itself to the device employed in the Standard-Humble 
84 Cf. the approved issuance of scrip certificates for fractional shares in Rev. Rul. 55-
59, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-6, 7, dealing with a "C" reorganization. 
85 Letter Ruling dated October 28, 1954, bearing symbols 'T:R:R GP." 
86 Neither did the fact that Standard paid the agent and the agent's expenses in con· 
nection with the exchange, and paid all state and federal issuance and transfer taxes. 
87 Cf. Daisy M. Ward, 29 B.T.A. 1251 (1934), note 75 supra; The Fifth Avenue 
Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934), note 75 supra; Rev. Rul. 54-65, 1954-1 Cum. 
Bul. 101. 
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reorganization indicates the desirability of not construing the "B" 
reorganization definition narrowly. Under section 368(a)(l)(B), 
properly interpreted, the artificial nature of the procedure would not 
have been necessary had Standard been certain that it would obtain 
enough shares of Humble for whole shares of Standard to give it 80 
percent control of Humble-in such case it could have itself given cash 
for fractional shares without the intervention of an agent. 
III. BuYING OuT MmoruTY INTERESTS FOR CASH 
When it was desired, under the 1939 code, to buy out a small 
minority interest for cash upon the merging of two corporations, a 
statutory merger (an "A" reorganization) rather than a "practical 
merger" (a "C" reorganization) offered the solution to the problem. 
The trouble was that it was (and still is) not always possible to effect 
a statutory merger; not all states have merger statutes. 88 
The striking feature of the "A" reorganization provision under both 
the 1939 and 1954 codes89 is that there is no spelling otit of what the 
shareholders of the merged or of the continuing corporation must 
receive. Thus, it is possible for any combination of voting and non-
voting stock, securities, cash and other property to be received by them 
without disqualifying the reorganization from meeting the "A" re-
organization requirements. 90 
The 1954 code narrows considerably the differences in tax treat- _ 
ment of "A" and "C" reorganizations. An important change designed 
to make practical mergers more feasible from a tax viewpoint is one 
providing91 that (I) if a corporation acquires substantially all of the 
properties of another corporation, and (2) if the "C" reorganization 
definition would be met but for the fact the acquiring corporation ex-
changes "money or other property" in addition to voting stock, and 
88 For a compilation of states not permitting statutory mergers or consolidations of a 
"domestic" and a "foreign" corporation, or even of two domestic corporations, see Fahey 
"Income Tax Definition of 'Reorganization,'" 39 CoL. L. REv. 933 at 948 (1939). Mr. 
Fahey also discusses at pp. 946-947 the application of the "A" reorganization definition 
to mergers and consolidation under federal statutes. See also Gutkin, "Merger and Con-
solidation Problems," N.Y.U. 8TH .ANNuAL lNsTITUTB ON FEDERAL TAXATION 174 at 175 
(1950). Some state statutes have been amended since the lists were compiled. 
89 I.R.C. (1939), §ll2(g)(l)(A); I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(A). 
90 However, the judicially developed concepts of "continuity of interests" and of 
''business purpose" must be met, and the taxation of "boot" provisions must be taken into 
account. 
91 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(B). See Senate Report, pp. 263, 274. Cf. House Bill 
§359(c), and the discussion in H. Rep., pp. Al33-Al34. 
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(3) if the acquiring corporation acquires solely for its own voting stock 
or solely for voting stock of a corporation controlling it, property of the 
transferor corporation having a fair market value which is at least 
80 percent of the fair market value of all (not merely the transferred 
portion) of the transferor corporation's property, then such acquisition , 
will be treated92 as a "C" reorganization. Solely for the purpose of this 
determination, "the amount of any liability assumed by the acquiring 
corporation and the amount of any liability to which any property 
acquired is subject,"93 is treated as money paid for the property. 
Thus, under the 1954 code, as long as voting stock is given for 
property having a fair market value which is at least 80 percent of the 
fair market value of all of the property of the transferor corporation, 
the remaining consideration paid by the acquiring corporation can be 
money or other property. Moreover, there is no requirement that the 
consideration other than voting stock be distributed pro rata to the 
stockholders of the transferor corporation.94 Even if a corporation's 
entire assets are transferred in a "C" reorganization for voting stock 
plus cash not exceeding the 20 percent restriction, the "continuity of 
interest" rule will not be violated if one group of shareholders receives 
only voting stock and the other group of shareholders receives only 
cash.95 All this is in furtherance of the congressional intent to alleviate 
the difficulties in completing transactions which existed under the 1939 
code where certain shareholders of the transferor corporation wished 
to receive property rather than stock in the acquiring corporation. 
92 Subject to the provisions of I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(2)(A), which provides that if 
a transaction meets both the "C'! and the "D" reorganization definitions it is treated as a 
''D" reorganization. 
93 It would seem, since a liability which is assumed may also be a liability to which 
an acquired property is subject, that modification of this language would be in order when 
the ''Technical Changes Act of 1955" is under consideration. 
94 If the transferor corporation does not distribute the money or other property 
received (other than stock or securities of the acquiring corporation) in pursuance of the 
plan of reorganization, gain will be recognized, but not in excess of the money and fair 
market value of other property received and not distributed. I.R.C. (1954), §361(b)(I)(B). 
Shareholders of the transferor corporation who wish to receive securities, money or 
other property in addition to voting stock, should be aware of the possibility of realization 
of some ordinary income under I.R.C. (1954), §356(a)(2). See I.R.C. (1954), 
§§354(a)(2), 356(a)(I)(B) and 356(d)(2)(B). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §302(b). 
95 Jmplicit in the adoption of this rule is that paying out 20% of the shareholders in 
cash does not run afoul of the "continuity of interest" rule. See Senate Report, p. 52. 
See also Lyons, "Realignment of Stockholders' Interests in Reorganizations Under Section 
112(g)(I)(D)," 9 TAX L. R.E.v. 237 (1954). 
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A. The 80 Percent-20 Percent Rule 
The application of the 80 percent-20 percent rule may be illus-
trated96 as follows: Corporation A has assets worth $100,000 and 
$10,000 in liabilities. Corporation Y acquires $98,000 worth of assets 
subject to a liability of $10,000. In exchange for these assets, Corpora-
tion Y transfers its own voting stock, assumes the $10,000 liability, and 
pays $8,000 in cash. This transaction qualifies as a "C" reorganization 
even though a part of the assets of Corporation A is acquired for cash. 
If, however, the assets of Corporation A in the above example were 
subject to $50,000 in liabilities rather than only $10,000, an acquisi-
tion of all the assets subject to the liabilities could only be for voting 
stock because Corporation A's liabilities alone are in excess of 20 per-
cent of the fair market value of all of the property transferred. In such 
a case, a statutory merger or consolidation would be required in order 
to have the transaction qualify as a reorganization. 97 
Although the transferor corporation can transfer up to 20 percent 
(in fair market value) of its property for other than voting stock, in. 
practice this provision will not have wide application. The reason for 
this is the revival to a limited extent of the rule derived from the 
Hendler98 case, which would treat the assumption by a transferee cor-
poration of the liabilities of a transferor as the receipt of "boot" by the 
latter. This "melancholy victory"99 by the government was reversed 
by the enactment of section 213 of the Revenue Act of 1939, the pro-
visions of which are continued in the 1954 code.100 Nevertheless, 
since the transfer of substantially all of the properties of one corporation 
to another in a "C" reorganization situation is commonly accompanied 
by the latter assuming the indebtedness of the transferor, any hoped-for 
benefit from the liberalization of the "C" reorganization rules by sec-
tion 368(a)(2)(B) may prove to be illusory in many instances. 
96 The illustration is taken from Senate Report, pp. 274-275. See also Proposed 
Regulations, § l.368-2(d)(3). 
97 H there were some special reasons for not transferring certain assets to the acquiring 
corporation, these assets could be distributed to the stockholders of the transferor corpora-
tion as part of the plan of reorganization, the state law as to mergers and consolidations 
permitting. 
9s United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 58 S.Ct. 655 (1938), rehearing den. 304 
U.S. 588, 58 S.Ct. 940 (1938). The ramifications of the Hendler decision are discussed 
in Surrey, "Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges," 50 YALE L.J. 1 (1940). 
99 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXAnoN, Third Series, 138 (1940); Surrey, 
"Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges," 50 YALE L.J. 1 at 10-14 (1940), 
which recite the difficulties the Treasury was faced with after the government won the 
Hendler case. 
100 See I.R.C. (1954), §§357 and 368(a)(l)(C). 
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The assumption of all liabilities of the transferor, including con-
tingent or undisclosed liabilities, could cause a violation of the terms 
of 80 percent-20 percent exception which would not show up until 
some time after the consummation of the reorganization. The excep-
tion in section 368 (a)(2)(B) is not written in terms of the estimated 
amount of liabilities assumed, but rather in terms of "the amount," 
which could perhaps be determined by hindsight. The discreet will 
therefore, in such circumstances, choose the statutory merger or con-
solidation route to accomplish their purposes and not risk the uncer-
tainty of a practical merger qualifying as a tax-free "reorganization." 
The limited assumption of liabilities could also be considered. 
The Proposed Regulations show no awareness of the need to define 
what is meant by "the amount" of liabilities assumed. It is arguable 
that where all the liabilities of the transferor are assumed by the trans-
feree, including contingent and undisclosed liabilities, "the amount" 
of the liabilities for the purpose of applying the 80 percent-20 percent 
rule should be the estimated amount value thereof based on the facts 
known to the parties on the date of the transfer, rather than the actual 
ultimate amount of liability.101 Otherwise, in some instances it may be 
years after a transaction takes places before one could be certain that 
the terms of the 80 percent-20 percent exception have been met. 
There are certain practical difficulties attendant upon the above 
suggestion. For one thing, parties to a corporate reorganization would 
always run the tax risk, in valuing contingent and disputed liabilities, 
that the Service would later1°2 disagree with the valuation. The Serv-
ice is especially likely to raise the issue if subsequent events should 
be such that the estimated valuation in fact proves to have been too low. 
The parties should not be required to run this tax risk where they can 
show that the valuation of contingent and disputed liabilities was 
arrived at in good faith and as a result of arm's-length negotiations seek-
ing to fix their relative interests. 
How should a liability be valued if its actual or potential existence 
is undisclosed (innocently or otherwise) by the transferor to the trans-
feree? In such a case there can be no value estimated by the transferee, 
lOlCf. dissenting opinion of Justice Reed in Commissioner v. Estate of Louis Stern-
berger, 348 U.S. 187 at 200, 75 S.Ct. 229 (1955). Interpreting I.R.C. (1939), §812, 
which allows as a deduction "the amount of all bequests • • • to • • • any corporation 
organized and operated exclusively for ••• charitable ••• purposes ••• ," Justice Reed 
states at 201: "It is the 'amount' of the bequest that is deductible-its presently ascertain-
able value." 
102 It is doubtful that the Service would give an advance ruling on the valuation 
question. See Int. Rev. - Mimeograph No. 100, Com. No. 11, January 12, 1953, paragraph 4, 
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to whom the actual or potential liability has no known existence. Also, 
neither party may be aware of the existence of a potential liability. 
For example, if the transferee assumes all liabilities, and thereafter 
the Service asserts the existence of a completely unexpected tax liability 
on the part of the transferor on a theory which everyone had thereto-
fore assumed was clearly settled in favor of the taxpayer,1°3 whose 
judgment as to "the amount" (as of the reorganization date) of the 
tax liability assumed by the transferee is to be accepted-the taxpayer's 
or the Service's (based on the Service's internal administrative think-
ing on the problem)? Here again, a party acting in good faith and at 
arm's length should be permitted to rely on the estimated value of as-
sumed contingent and other liabilities. 
In view of the above difficulties, it is likely that the 80 percent-20 
percent rule will in practice be little availed of, except in those cases 
where the transferee does not assume contingent and undisclosed lia-
bilities. Perhaps in the future the Congress may see fit to exempt such 
liabilities (or indeed, all assumed liabilities)104 from the 80 percent-20 
percent formula provided in section 368(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
IV. REcEIPT OF VoTING STOCK OF BoTH AcQUmING CoRPoRATION 
AND !Ts PARENT OR SuBSIDIARY IN "C" REORGANIZATION 
The new "C" reorganization definition does not specifically permit 
the corporation transferring substantially all of its assets ( Corporation 
W), or its shareholders, to receive both voting stock pf the acquiring 
corporation (Corporation A) and voting stock of its parent (Corporation 
P); the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all of the prop-
erties of another corporation must be in exchange "solely for all or a 
part of its [the acquiring corporation's] voting stock (or in exchange 
solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation which is in 
control of the acquiring corporation) .... " 
It is questionable whether any valid "continuity-of interest" policy 
decision underlies this particular legislative restriction. If Congress 
has chosen to decree that the transferor corporation (Corporation W) 
103 For example, the Godley-Hirshon problem. See Mintz and Plumb, "Dividends in 
Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look," 10 T.u: L. REv. 41 (1954); Michael P. 
Erburu, 23 T.C. No. 104, January 31, 1955. 
104Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(I)(C): " ••• in determining whether the exchange 
is solely for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, 
or the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded. •• .'' 
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or its shareholders have a sufficient continuity of interest in the assets 
transferred to Corporation A where the consideration for the transfer is 
voting stock in Corporation P, it defies logic for it to deny that there is a 
sufficient continuity of interest where Corporation W or its sharehold-
ers receive not only some voting stock in Corporation P but also voting 
stock in Corporation A.105 Indeed, the necessary continuity of interest 
was found to exist in such a situation by both the Board of Tax Appeals 
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,1°6 prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in the Groman case. The restriction is even more per-
plexing since the possibility exists under the new "C" reorganization 
provision of Corporation W transferring its assets to' Corporation A in 
exchange for voting stock of Corporation P, and of Corporation A 
immediately transferring the assets to a subsidiary of Corporation A.101 
The assets of Corporation W in such a case are twice removed from 
Corporation P, and yet the Corporation W shareholders, through own-
ership of a part of Corporation P's voting stock, are deemed to have a 
sufficient continuity of interest in the transferred assets to constitute 
the transaction as a "C'' reorganization. 
Regardless of the failure of section 368(a)(l)(C) specifically to 
permit Corporation W or its shareholders to receive both voting stock 
of Corporation P and voting stock of Corporation A, the 80 percent-
20 percent rule does appear to _permit in a limited way the giving 
of both Corporation P voting stock and Corporation A voting stock. 
The Proposed Regulations do not take this possibility into account, and 
the following sentence in section l.368-2(d) of the Proposed Regula-
tions requires modification: " ... if the properties of Corporation W 
are acquired in exchange for voting stock of both Corporation P and 
Corporation A, the transaction will not constitute a reorganization un-
der Section 368(a)(l)(C)." 
105 Perhaps what Congress was concerned with here, if it thought of the problem at 
all, was the possibility of a "bail-out" should the Corporation W shareholders receive 
voting stock of both Corporation P and Corporation A. Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §306. 
106 Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, (3d Cir. 1936), 84 F. (2d) 
787, affg. 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934), interpreting the Revenue Act of 1928. Antitoxin 
transferred all of its assets to Laboratories (a newly-formed subsidiary of Cyanamid) under 
a reorganization agreement drawn up between Antitoxin and Cyanamid, in exchange for 
64,500 shares of Cyanamid Class B common and 75,000 shares of Laboratories nonvoting 
preferred. Both Cyanamid and Laboratories were held to be parties to the reorganization. 
The Third Circuit said: "Undoubtedly, there is the continuity of interest in the Antitoxin 
assets through acquisition of the stock in both companies which is stressed in Helvering v. 
Minnesota Tea Company •••• " 84 F. (2d) 787 at 789. 
101 I.R.C. (1954), §368(a)(l)(C) and (2)(C). 
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One of the conditions of the 80 percent-20 percent rule is that it 
applies only if "the acquisition would qualify under paragraph (l)(C) 
but for the fact that the acquiring corporation exchanges money or 
other property in addition to voting stock. . . ." Suppose all of the 
assets of Corporation W are acquired and 80 percent of the considera-
tion therefor is voting stock of Corporation A and 20 percent is voting 
stock of Corporation P ( Corporation A being the acquiring corpora-
tion), or suppose it is the other way around and it is 80 percent Cor-
poration P and 20 percent Corporation A voting stock (Corporation P 
being the acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Cor-
poration W's assets to Corporation A's). It would appear that the voting 
stock in the 20 percent category may properly be treated as "other 
property" within the meaning of the above-quoted qualification. There 
is nothing in the statute108 which requires that the "money or other 
property" referred to in section 368(a)(2)(B)(ii) constitute ''boot," 
the receipt of which is subject to the recognition of gain rules of sec-
tion 356, or which i:i;idicates that voting stock (or nonvoting stock) of 
a party to the reorganization was not meant to be included in the scope 
of "other property." 
It may be that ultimately the Treasury will recognize, either volun-
tarily or through judicial mandate, that there is a "C'' reorganization 
and that the 80 percent-20 percent rule applies where all of the 
assets of Corporation Ware acquired and 80 percent of the considera-
tion therefor is voting stock of Corporation A and 20 percent of the 
voting stock of Corporation P ( Corporation A being the acquiring 
corporation), or where 80 percent is voting stock of Corporation P and 
20 percent is voting stock of Corporation A (Corporation P being the 
acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Corporation W's 
assets to Corporation A). The Treasury, nevertheless, may couple such 
recognition with a contention that the Groman decision is still good 
law, and that at least in the case where the 20 percent is voting stock 
of Corporation P (Corporation A being the acquiring corporation), 
Corporation P is not a party to the reorganization.109 Under this ap-
proach the voting stock of Corporation P would constitute ''boot" re-
ceived as part of a "C" reorganization. However, where Corporation P 
is the acquiring corporation, with an immediate transfer of Corpora-
tion W's assets to Corporation A, I believe there is substance to the 
petition that Corporation A as well as Corporation P is a party to the 
10s See also Senate Report, p. 52; House Report, p. Al33. 
109 But cf. note 106 supra, and the text thereto. See note 36 supra. 
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"C" reorganization, and that no "boot" is involved in the transaction. 
Indeed, the Bashford case110 assumes this conclusion as to Corporation 
A, and the 1954 code111 brings about this result as to Corporation P. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems appropriate to conclude by quoting Justice Reed's recent 
pronouncement:112 on the Regulations problem: 
"Regulations do not have the safeguards of federal statu-
tory enactments. Interested parties outside the Internal Rev-
enue Service perhaps may not be heard. Reports explaining the 
action are not available. Public discussion, such as happens in 
Congress, does not take place. In short, we think that reenact-
ment of a statute after the due adoption of a regulation does not 
make the regulation a part of the statute. It is only an indication 
of congressional purpose to be weighed in the context and circum-
stances of the statutory language." 
When the Proposed Regulations under subchapter C of chapter I 
of the 1954 code, which includes the corporate reorganization provi-
sions, were published in the Federal Register on December 11, 1954, 
the Treasury announced that prior to the adoption of the final Regu-
lations, consideration will be given to "any data, views, or arguments 
pertaining thereto" which were submitted in writing (in duplicate) by 
January 10, 1955 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This 
30-day deadline was later extended to January 24, 1955. It is to be 
hoped that the Treasury will carefully consider the suggestions made to 
it, bearing constantly in mind that its proper function is to interpret 
and administer within the framework of the statutory language and 
congressional intent.113 One of the deans of the tax bar has observed, 
110 In Commissioner v. Bashford, (3d Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 827, revd. sub nom. 
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 58 S.Ct. 307 (1938), the Commissioner conceded 
that Corporation A was a party to the reorganization; the issue was whether Corporation P 
was also a party thereto. 
111 Section 368(b), last sentence. 
112 Commissioner v. Estate 0£ Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 at 206, 75 S.Ct. 229 
(1955) (dissenting opinion). 
113 While the words 0£ Congress often are sufficient in and 0£ themselves to determine 
the purpose of legislation, and the plain meaning 0£ the words will be followed, where the 
meaning would lead to absurd or futile results, or even merely an unreasonable one "plainly 
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole," the Supreme Court has followed 
that policy rather than the literal words. United States v. American Trucking Association, 
Inc., 310 U.S. 534 at 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059 (1940); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 at 
409, 66 S.Ct. 193 (1945). 
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"The government cannot be expected to abandon its past tendency to 
press the courts as far as possible to interpret and develop the tax law 
in its favor."114 Nevertheless, the exercise of a measure of self-imposed 
Treasury restraint when promulgating the final Regulations would be a 
wholesome development. Experience indicates that over-zealousness in 
taking the narrow view does not always serve the Treasury well, and 
that the reasonable approach better serves the common weal.116 
114Darrell, ''The Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 1955 SoUTHBJIN CALIPoRNIA 
TAX INSTITUTE 1 (1955). It is equally true, as Mr. Darrell observes, that "Taxpayers 
cannot be expected to cease their never ending search for means of cutting down their 
taxes." · 
115 See, for example, the article and treatise cited in note 99 supra, discussing the 
Treasury's difficulties with the problem of assumption of indebtedness in coiporate reorgani-
zations. 
